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Arno W Krebs, Jr. *
I. LIABILITY INSURANCE
Personal Injury Protection Coverage. During the past year two cases were
decided interpreting the scope of personal injury protection coverage' that
merit inclusion in the Survey. Slocum v. United Pacific Insurance Co.2
dealt with the definition of an income producer. Creighton v. Fidelity &
Casualty Co.3 dealt with the double recovery problem when there are two
policies in force.
In Slocum a Texas appellate court was faced for the first time with de-
ciding who was an income producer within the terms of article 5.06-3 of
the Texas Insurance Code.' The statute does not define "income pro-
ducer." The PIP endorsement 243 does, however, define an income pro-
ducer as "a person who at the time of an accident was in an occupational
status where such person was earning or producing income."' The plain-
tiff in Slocum was an engineering student who had accepted summer em-
ployment. During the weekend preceding employment, however, he was
injured in an automobile accident and did not report to work as planned.
He had worked the previous summer. The insurance company denied his
claim, and this suit resulted.
The trial court granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment.
The court of civil appeals, however, reversed and remanded. The court
held that neither the statute nor the policy definition of income producer
could be construed to deny recovery of lost income to one who had ac-
cepted a firm offer of employment, was to report to work at a definite time
and at a set rate of compensation, but was prevented from doing so by an
accident. Thus, a fact question was raised as to whether plaintiff was an
income producer as that term is defined in the policy.'
In Creighton the question as to whether PIP coverage is an indemnity
provision was before the court. The insurer had written two policies of
insurance, one for John Creighton and one for his adult daughter, Lynn.
Both policies provided $5,000 in PIP coverage. Lynn resided at all mate-
rial times in the same household as her father, who was the head of the
household. John Creighton's daughter, Rafaela Creighton, age thirteen,
* B.A., Texas A&M University; LL.B., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Ful-
bright & Jaworski, Houston, Texas.
1. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-3 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1979).
2. 577 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
3. 581 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, no writ).
4. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-3 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1979).
5. 577 S.W.2d at 806 (emphasis added by the court).
6. Id.
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also resided in the same household, and was covered by both policies.
Rafaela was involved in a hit-and-run accident that resulted in damages of
$4,966.32. Fidelity & Casualty, the issuer of both policies, paid this
amount. The plaintiff filed suit alleging that because premiums had been
paid for each policy, the benefits of each policy should be paid in full
though the result would be a double recovery under the circumstances.
The trial court entered judgment for the carrier and the court of civil
appeals affirmed, holding that the benefits paid under PIP could not in the
aggregate exceed the actual loss sustained as computed under the policies.7
The court noted that the question would be more difficult had the PIP loss
exceeded the policy limits of $5,000 and reserved judgment on that situa-
tion. The court further noted that the PIP coverage under each policy was
$5,000, twice the statutory maximum. The court stated that its decision
was based not only on the policy but also on the statute. Neither the policy
provisions nor the statutory provisions allow the stacking of coverages to
exceed the actual loss suffered.
Uninsured Motorist's Coverage. The only uninsured motorist case that
merits inclusion in this survey deals with the definition of "resident of the
same household" under the terms of the policy. In Hartford Casualty In-
surance Co. v. Phillps8 the named insured sued her insurer to recover for
injuries sustained by her son caused by an uninsured motorist. The named
insured, a divorcee, had custody of her minor son, aged fourteen, by court
order. The minor lived with his father, however, through an agreement
between the parents and without a change in the custody order. He went
to school in the district where his father lived, was taken as a dependent on
his father's tax return, and kept most of his clothes and had his meals at his
father's home. He also had clothes at his mother's home, however, and ate
there when he was with his mother. The jury found that the minor plain-
tiff was a resident of her household, and the court of civil appeals affirmed.
The court held that a person, particularly a child, can have more than one
residence as distinguished from a domicile.9 Although the named insured
was his legal custodian and could have required her son to live with her,
that she did not do so did not prevent him from being a resident of her
household.' ° Further, the finding that he was a resident of his mother's
household would not have prevented a similar finding with regard to his
being a resident of his father's household."
Legislative Changes. The Texas Legislature amended section 4(b) of arti-
cle 5.06-1 of the Texas Insurance Code' 2 as it pertains to recovery of
property damages. Section 4(b) previously provided that if the insured
7. 581 S.W.2d at 816.
8. 575 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ).
9. Id. at 63.
10. Id. at 64.
I1. Id.
12. 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 626, § 1, at 1418 (Vernon).
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had both collision coverage and uninsured or underinsured property dam-
age coverage, recovery could only be had "under the coverage which is
subject to the lower deductible amount."' 3 Section 4(b) as amended pro-
vides that if the insured has both collision coverage and uninsured or un-
derinsured property damage coverage, the insured may recover under the
policy coverage chosen by him. In the event neither coverage is alone suf-
ficient to cover all damages from a single occurrence, the insured may re-
cover under both coverages. In no event, however, shall the insured have
the right to recover more than the actual damages suffered less the greater
of the deductibles that may be applicable to either of these two cover-
ages. 14
Conditions. The Texas courts were again faced with problems arising out
of the insured's failure to notify the insurer of an accident as required by
the liability insurance policy." In Broussard v. Lumbermens Mutual Casu-
alty Co. 16 suit was brought against the insurer by the insured and the judg-
ment creditor who had recovered in a personal injury suit against the
insured. The personal injury plaintiff sustained serious personal injuries
while on the premises of the insured. The president of the insured learned
of the accident on the same day but did not give notice to his liability
insurance carrier until he was served with suit papers twenty months later.
The only reason that he did not report the accident was because he thought
the injured person was being taken care of by his workers' compensation
carrier. 7 The court stated that because the facts were not in dispute, the
question as to whether notice was given as soon as practicable was one of
law. The court held that this was not as soon as practicable as a matter of
law and further held that the excuse that the injured person was being
taken care of by his workers' compensation carrier is legally insufficient.' 8
A similar failure to comply with policy conditions occurred in Shelton v.
Ray. '1 The insurance company was not advised of the accident and subse-
quent suit until after the default judgment was taken against the insured.
The policy was issued on February 16, 1976, and the accident occurred on
March 25, 1976. The State Insurance Board issued its new prejudice en-
dorsement on May 1, 1976.20 The court held that the law in effect on the
13. Id.
14. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-1, § 4(b) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1979). This
amendment was effective on Jan. 1, 1980.
15. See, e.g., Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roman, 498 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1973).
16. 582 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ).
17. Compliance with the provisions that notice be given as soon as practicable is a con-
dition precedent under the policy and a breach thereof voids coverage. Members Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Cutaia, 476 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. 1972). This accident occurred before the new endorse-
ment was issued by the state insurance board on May 1, 1976, under which prejudice must
be shown for late notice to void coverage. See note 20 infra.
18. 582 S.W.2d at 263.
19. 570 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, no writ).
20. This endorsement, which was issued pursuant to the supreme court suggestion in
Members Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cutaia, 476 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. 1972), provides:
As respects bodily injury liability coverage and property damage liability cov-
erage, unless the company is prejudiced by the insured's failure to comply
1980]
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date of issuance of the policy was controlling. Consequently, the insurance
company had a good policy defense and was not liable for any judgment.2'
The personal injury plaintiff, who filed this suit for collection of the
judgment, asserted that the company had waived its rights to defend on the
merits. The plaintiff argued that if the company had consented to the
granting of a new trial, it could have avoided any harm from the default
judgment. Thus, the case could have begun anew without prejudice to the
insured or the company. The court held that because the company was not
a party to the default judgment, it could not consent to setting aside the
judgment. Further, judgment had already been entered against the in-
sured for amounts in excess of the policy limits. Thus, had the company
gotten the judgment set aside and a subsequent judgment been even larger,
the insured would have had a cause of action against the company. The
court indicated that had the company been advised of the judgment before
it became final, it might have had the duty to set the judgment aside if it
could have reduced the insured's liability to within the policy limits. The
company was not advised of the judgment, however, before it became final
and never had an opportunity to settle the case as the plaintiff had never
agreed to reduce the claim to an amount within the policy limits. 22
The many problems arising out of the failure to forward suit papers and
the failure to give notice of an accident is further illustrated by National
Savings Insurance Co. v. Gaskins.23 James Gaskins's daughter was alleg-
edly injured by substances used by a pest control company insured by Na-
tional Savings. Gaskins filed suit against the insured, and National
Savings in turn filed a declaratory judgment action against the insured and
Gaskins. The insurance company alleged that it had no duty to defend the
insured because timely notice was not given, the incident was not covered
by the terms of the policy, and the employee-defendant was not a named
insured.
The personal injury plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment to
National's declaratory judgment action, claiming that there was no justici-
able controversy with the company on its duty to defend. A declaratory
judgment is not available unless there is a justiciable controversy between
the parties.24 The court granted the plaintiffs' motion and severed the
cause so judgment would be final, and the company appealed. On appeal
the personal injury plaintiffs alleged that there was no justiciable contro-
versy because they were not party to the insurance contract and did not
care who, if anyone, defended the insured. Further, they had no interest
adverse to the company. The insurer alleged that there was a justiciable
with the requirement, any provision of this policy requiring the insured to give
notice of action, occurrence or loss, or requiring the insured to forward de-
mands, notices, summons or other legal process, shall not bar liability under
this policy.
570 S.W.2d at 420.
21. 570 S.W.2d at 421.
22. Id.
23. 572 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, no writ).
24. Id. at 574.
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controversy because the personal injury plaintiffs had an interest in
whether they would be able to collect any judgment they might recover
against the insured and they would sue the company directly to collect an
unsatisfied judgment. Therefore, a real and adverse claim existed. The
company relied upon the United States Supreme Court case of Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co. ,25 which held in a similar fact situa-
tion that there was a justiciable controversy.26 This court held, however,
that though the test for justiciability used in the Maryland Casualty Co.
decision may have been the same as that used in Texas, the Texas Supreme
Court has construed the Texas Constitution as prohibiting judicially ren-
dered advisory opinions.27
The company also argued that since a breach of a notice provision oper-
ates as a defense, both to the duty to defend as well as to the duty to pay,
all those interested in resolution of the issue should be parties to the suit.
Otherwise, the personal injury plaintiffs would not be bound by the deter-
mination, and the notice defense could be relitigated.28 This could lead to
different courts reaching different results on the same issue. The court
stated that since no judgment had been granted to the personal injury
plaintiffs, it would be an advisory opinion as to whether or not the per-
sonal injury plaintiffs could collect the judgment because the question of
the insured's refusal or inability to pay had not yet arisen. The court ob-
served that "a considerable amount ofjudicial wheel spinning for nothing"
would result in deciding the controversy.29
A considerable amount of judicial wheel spinning will result, however,
based on the opinion in this case. The court does not recognize the reality
that few insureds will respond to a judgment. Consequently, the personal
injury plaintiff will necessarily have to file suit against the insurance com-
pany to recover the judgment. Since the controversy exists and the suit has
been filed, the court should join the third of three interested parties and
litigate the entire matter in one proceeding, rather than basing the decision
on the distinction that the personal injury plaintiff is not a party to the
contract between the insured and the insurer and that no judgment has
been entered and, consequently, there is no controversy.
The last case involving interpretation of the conditions of the policy is
25. 312 U.S. 270 (1941).
26. There were three bases for that court's decision: (I) state law permitted direct action
by the insured party against the insurance company to satisfy an unpaid judgment; (2) the
injured party could prevent the policy lapsing by performing the notice conditions; and (3) if
the claimant were not kept in a suit it would be possible for different courts to come to
conflicting decisions in their interpretations of the policy. Id. at 273.
27. 572 S.W.2d at 575; see Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Burch, 442 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex.
1968), in which the court held that declaratory judgment was unavailable to allow the deter-
mination as to whether the casualty insurer had the duty to pay a judgment prior to the entry
of such judgment.
28. Those who are not a party to a declaratory judgment action cannot be bound by the
results. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2524-1, § 11 (Vernon 1965).




Gulf Insurance Co. v. Texas Casualty Insurance Co.3' Glastron Boat Com-
pany and its truck driver were covered by separate policies issued by Gulf
on a truck rented by Glastron and Texas Casualty on the semi-trailer be-
ing towed. The driver was involved in an accident that resulted in one
death. Gulf wanted to settle this suit for $200,000. Numerous settlement
conferences were held between the attorneys for Gulf and Texas Casualty,
but to no avail. On October 7, 1971, Texas Casualty advised Gulf by letter
that it would not participate in any settlement.3 Four days later Gulf de-
manded that Texas Casualty assent to the reasonableness of the settlement
without prejudice to the questions of coverage to be later determined.
Texas Casualty was given forty-eight hours to assent or be liable for all
costs of settlement and expenses. Texas Casualty never responded, and
Gulf proceeded to settle the case. The matter was closed by a "friendly
suit '' 12 in which the federal court judge heard testimony, reviewed the evi-
dence, made findings of negligence and damages, and entered judgment.
Just prior to the hearing on the friendly suit, Glastron and the driver trans-
ferred their claims against Texas Casualty to Gulf; Gulf was subrogated
and assigned to their rights on October 14, 1971.
Both policies contained a no-action clause that provided that no action
would lie against the company until the insured's obligations to pay were
determined by actual trial or by written agreement of the insurer, the
claimant, and the company.33 Each policy also contained a subrogation
clause whereby the insured was to do nothing after loss to prejudice the
rights of the insurer.3 4
Gulf brought suit against Texas Casualty based on the subrogation
agreement. The court held that a friendly suit was not an actual trial,
which is required under the no-action clause, and, consequently, Texas
Casualty had no liability for the settlement or any portion thereof.35 Fur-
ther, the insured, Glastron, and the driver breached the subrogation provi-
30. 580 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
31. The letter provided that "it would be in order for your company to proceed to make
such settlement as it feels to be indicated under the facts without any assistance or permis-
sion from this Company." Id. at 649.
32. In a "friendly suit" the court renders judgment in a determination of whether to
approve an agreement brought to the court by the parties as opposed to judgment based on
litigated issues. Id. at 648.
33. The no-action clause provided:
No action shall lie against the company, unless, as a condition precedent
thereto, there shall have been full compliance with all the terms of the policy,
nor until the amount of the insured's obligation to pay shall have been finally
determined either by judgment against the insured after actual trial or by writ-
ten agreement of the insured, the claimant and the company ....
Id. at 647.
34. The clause specifically provided:
In the event of any payment under this policy the company shall be subro-
gated to all the insured's rights of recovery therefor against any person or
organization and the insured shall execute and deliver instruments and papers
and do whatever else is necessary to secure such rights. The insured shall do
nothing after loss to prejudice such rights.
Id.
35. Id. at 647-48.
[Vol. 34
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sion in the Texas Casualty policy.36 The court further held that Texas
Casualty had not waived its policy defenses or conducted itself in such a
manner as to be estopped to rely on these defenses. Texas Casualty was
not advised of the friendly suit or the hearing thereon and, further, Texas
Casualty had notified Gulf that if it effected a settlement it would be with-
out assistance from Texas Casualty.37
As in Maryland Casualty Co., the court, based upon a literal reading of
the insurance policy, held that Texas Casualty had no liability. Again,
however, the court failed to recognize the practicality that should be appli-
cable in this situation. It has rewarded an uncooperative and intransigent
participant, in this case an insurance company. The court's stated goal of
encouraging settlements has been left in the wake since few insurance
companies will undertake the burdens of their brethren in such situations.
Though there are possible distinctions, it appears that this decision is
contrary to at least the spirit of the decision in Employers Casualty Co. v.
Transport Insurance Co. 8 The Texas Supreme Court there held that the
settling insurer could recover a pro rata part of the settlement under the
doctrine of contractual, conventional, or equitable subrogation.39 The
court did not discuss the no-action clause or the possible breach of the
subrogation provision by the insured. Further, the decision in Texas Casu-
alty is contrary to Gulf Insurance Co. v. Parker Products, Inc. 40 and Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co. v. General Insurance Corp.4' In Gulf the insurer un-
conditionally refused to defend and denied coverage. The insured settled
and brought suit to recover the amount of the settlement. The Texas
Supreme Court held that the insurance company could not rely on the no-
action clause42 "after it is given the opportunity to defend the suit or to
agree to the settlement and refuses to do either on the erroneous ground
that it has no responsibility under the policy."43 In Liberty, as in Texas
Casualty, two insurance companies were involved and the same decision
was reached as in Guf.
Coverage. In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Volentine" the insured garage
owner sought a declaratory judgment against his insurer for a determina-
36. See Foundation Reserve Ins. Co. v. Cody, 458 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1970, no writ); Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 392 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Tyler 1965, no writ); Gulf Ins. Co. v. White, 242 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1951,
no writ). The identical legal principle in these cases exists in this case:
[Ilf the insurer which has contracted that it is to receive the rights to subroga-
tion is denied that for which it contracted by the action of its insured there is
material breach by the insured; and because of the breach the benefit other-
wise applicable or payable to him may not be enforced against the company.
580 S.W.2d at 648.
37. Id. at 649.
38. 444 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. 1969).
39. Id. at 610.
40. 498 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. 1973).
41. 517 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, writ refd n.r.e.).
42. This clause is identical to that of the instant case.
43. 498 S.W.2d at 679.
44. 578 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, no writ).
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tion as to whether the insurer was obligated to defend him in a suit
brought by a customer. The customer had sued for property damage re-
sulting from the destruction of a car engine allegedly due to the insured's
defective performance of a valve overhaul job. The policy provided cover-
age for the insured in situations in which property damage was caused by
an occurrence arising out of garage operations. 45 First, the insurer con-
tended that there was no coverage because the alleged defective perform-
ance of the work was not an accident. The court stated that defective
performance of the work might or might not be considered an accident;
however, the destruction of the entire engine as the result of the malfunc-
tion of one of the repaired valves was unexpected and unintended and
constituted an accident within the meaning of the policy provisions.46
Secondly, the insurer contended that the policy did not apply because of
the exclusion for property damage to work performed by or on behalf of
the named insured.47 The court held that this exclusion did not apply,
however, because the language did not exclude coverage for damages due
to work performed. It only excluded damages to the work performed. 8
The court stated correctly that the obligation to defend must be based on
the allegations of the petition. No allegations were made that the garage
owner performed any work on the engine except the valves. Other parts of
the automobile engine would, therefore, constitute "other property" under
the rule interpreting this exclusion.49 To the extent that these other parts
were damaged or destroyed, the insured had coverage under the policy.5"
The trial court had further based its decision on exclusion (a) of the
policy regarding incidental contracts and warranties of fitness. This exclu-
sion provided that there would be no coverage for liability assumed by the
insured under any contract or agreement, except an incidental contract,
but that this exclusion did not apply with regard to warranties of fitness of
the named insured's products.5 ' The exclusion was held by the court of
45. Occurrence was defined within the terms of the policy as follows: "'[O]ccurrence'
means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in
bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the
insured." Id. at 503.
46. Id.
47. This exclusion stated as follows: "This insurance does not apply, under the Garage
Liability Coverages:
(k) to property damage to work performed by or on behalf of the named insured arising out
of the work or any portion thereof, or out of materials, parts or equipment furnished in
connection therewith;" d. (emphasis in original).
48. Id.
49. The court noted the uniform rule that a liability policy containing such an exclusion
does not insure against repair or replacement of the insured's own defective work or prod-
uct, but the policy does cover the insured's liability for damages to other property resulting
from the defective condition of the work, even though injury to the work product itself is
excluded. Id. at 503-04.
50. Id. at 504.
51. This provision provided that the policy would not apply:
(a) to liability assumed by the insured under any contract or agreement except
an incidental contract; but this exclusion does not apply to a warranty of fitness
or quality of the named insured's products or a warranty that work performed
[Vol. 34
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civil appeals to remove breach of implied warranty of fitness, quality, or
workmanship from the specific exclusion relating to contractual liability
and did not grant or extend coverage. 2
In Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. v. Adams53 the in-
sureds, farm operators, sought a declaratory judgment to determine
whether the insurer had a duty to defend them in an action brought by a
third person. The policy in question was a Farmer's Comprehensive Per-
sonal Insurance policy that contracted to pay all sums that the insured
would be legally obligated to pay as damages caused by an occurrence
during the policy period. The policy excluded, however, coverage "(c) to
bodily injury or property damage arising out of the ownership, mainte-
nance, operation, use, loading or unloading of: (1) any aircraft;" and "(n)
to property damage arising out of any substance released or discharged
from any aircraft. . . ."" The suit against the insureds and the aviation
company was brought to recover for damages allegedly caused by negli-
gent use and distribution of a chemical spray discharged by an airplane
that the insured did not own. The spray was, however, for the insured's
cotton crops.
The insurance company contended that exclusion (c) applied, even
though the plaintiff insured did not personally use the aircraft. The word
"use" was not defined in the policy, and the court therefore applied the
settled rule of law that insurance policies will be interpreted and construed
favorably to the insured and strictly against the insurer. 5 The court stated
that in the instant situation it was reasonable to conclude that the Farmer's
Comprehensive Personal Insurance policy was sold to afford comprehen-
sive insurance coverage against the liability of the insureds in their farm-
ing business and that the exclusion was inserted to exclude liability arising
out of the personal pursuits of the insured. The court stated that if the
construction of the insurance carrier were applied, it would render one
policy exclusion, exclusion (n), meaningless because everything intended
to be excluded by exclusion (n) would have been excluded by exclusion (c).
The construction contended for by the insureds reconciled these exclu-
sions. The insureds argued that exclusion (n) meant that there was no cov-
erage for "property damage" arising from aerial spraying but that
exclusion (c) meant that there was coverage for "bodily injury" arising
from aerial spraying, at least when performed, as in this case, by an in-
dependent contractor.56
Security Mutual Casualty Co. v. Johnson" is one of three permissive use
cases decided during this survey period. Timothy Johnson brought suit to
by or on behalf of the named insured will be done in a workmanlike manner
Id. (emphasis in original).
52. Id. at 505.
53. 570 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
54. Id. at 568-69 (emphasis added).
55. E.g., Provident Washington Ins. Co. v. Proffitt, 150 Tex. 207, 239 S.W.2d 379 (1951).
56. 570 S.W.2d at 569-71.
57. 584 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. 1979).
1980]
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recover the amount of a judgment rendered against him for damages to a
pickup truck driven by him. Eugene George was employed by W.H. Mc-
Coln and was given a truck to drive home each night and to use on the
weekends for both business and personal reasons. George apparently per-
mitted his friend Johnson to use the pickup frequently, requiring only that
Johnson replace gasoline. This arrangement had been in effect for approx-
imately a year and one-half. In fact, Johnson believed that the pickup
belonged to George. The accident occurred while Johnson was driving the
vehicle and struck a lamppole. McColm filed suit against Johnson to re-
cover for property damages.
At the time of the collision, Herman Johnson, Timothy's father, had a
policy of personal injury and property damage liability insurance with the
defendant, Security Mutual. The policy, however, did not include colli-
sion or comprehensive coverage. Security Mutual refused to defend
Timothy or to pay the judgment. The policy did not apply to property "in
charge of" the insured.58 The trial court entered judgment for the insur-
ance company, but the court of civil appeals reversed. The supreme court
reversed and rendered judgment for the insurance company. In so doing
the court stated that Timothy Johnson had sole control of the pickup at the
time of the collision and was the only person present with an operator's
license. The court stated that in the ordinary meaning, one "in charge of'
personal property was one who has possession of it, has the right to exer-
cise dominion and control over it, and is actually exercising physical con-
trol over it. Therefore, the exclusion as to property "in charge of' the
insured was applicable in this case.59
The court further noted that normally a liability policy does not cover
damage to the insured's property or property within his control. If an in-
sured desires such coverage, he must secure collision or comprehensive
coverage and pay an additional premium. There was no collision coverage
in effect at the time of the accident, and the insured could not have ex-
pected such coverage under the provisions of the policy.6°
The second permissive use case is Gulf Insurance Co. v. Bobo.6 In this
case William C. Avett agreed to sell his pickup truck to David Havens.
Havens took delivery of the vehicle prior to the sale but had a wreck
before the sale was completed. Two women injured in the collision recov-
ered judgment against the seller's insurance company on a jury's finding
that the buyer was an additional insured under the terms of the policy. At
the time of the accident, possession had been delivered and all that re-
mained to be done was to "get the papers fixed." 62 The court stated that
the only interest necessary to the validity of an automobile liability insur-
58. This provision specifically provided: "This policy does not apply... (i) to injury
or destruction of... (2) property rented to or in charge of the insured other than a residence
or private garage." Id. at 704 (emphasis added by the court).
59. Id. at 705.
60. Id.
61. 580 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, writ granted).
62. Id. at 915.
[Vol. 34
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ance policy is that the insured may incur liability because of the operation
and maintenance or use of the automobile.63 There was no doubt that
Avett was an insured under the policy, but the question was whether
Havens was an additional insured.6' At the time of the events giving rise
to Havens's liability he was using Avett's truck with the consent of Avett.
The court of civil appeals stated that if there is a named insured, by the
provisions of an automobile liability policy, anyone using the vehicle de-
scribed by the policy with the insured's consent, either explicit or tacit, is
an additional insured by the policy provisions. That the named insured
might believe that the user was not subject to instructions from him is im-
material.65 The supreme court granted a writ of error on numerous points,
including: (1) whether Havens was an insured under Avett's policy; (2)
whether Havens had permissive use of the vehicle within the terms of
Avett's policy; (3) whether Avett had the control or requisite ownership of
the vehicle to grant permission to Havens to use the vehicle; and (4)
whether Avett retained an insurable interest in the vehicle.6 6
The last permissive use case is Coronado v. Employees National Insur-
ance Co. 67 In this case, Hernando Sotello, a unit operator for White Well
Service, was to drive his crew in a company pickup from the company
yard in Wickett to Monahans, where they lived. Disregarding standing
company rules, they stopped at a bar, drank beer, went to another bar,
played pool, and continued to drink beer. After midnight, Sotello left the
second bar in the pickup and was involved in a collision in which another
motorist was killed. The motorist's widow recovered judgment against
Sotello and then brought suit against Employees National to collect on its
comprehensive automobile liability policy issued to White Well Service.
After a jury trial, judgment was rendered n.o.v. for the insurance company
against the widow, and the court of civil appeals affirmed. The court held
that even though there was some evidence that Sotello's employer knew
that on at least two prior occasions he had used the pickup to go into an
unauthorized place with his crew, there was no evidence of express or im-
plied permission to use the vehicle at the time in question. The supreme
court has granted a writ of error68 to decide whether there was no evidence
to support the jury verdict that Sotello had implied permission to use the
pickup at the time of the accident.69
63. Id. at 916 (citing Gulf Ins. Co. v. Winn, 545 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1976, no writ)).
64. The applicable language of the policy reads: "Ill. Definition of Insured. (a) With
respect to the insurance ... the unqualified word 'insured' includes the named insured and
... also includes any person while using the automobile ... provided the actual use ... is
by the named insured ... or with the (his) permission .... 580 S.W.2d at 916.
65. Id.
66. 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 552 (Sept. 28, 1979).
67. 577 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ granted).
68. 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 409 (June 15, 1979).
69. After the survey period ended, the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court of civil
appeals decision. 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 110 (Dec. 15, 1979). The court agreed "with the lower
courts that at the time of the accident the employee had materially deviated from the scope
of the permission granted him by the company." Id. at I11.
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Houston General Insurance Co. v. Lane Wood Industries, Inc. 70 involved
the interpretation of the assignment of interest clause in a policy.7' Lane
Wood purchased the manufacturing operation and other assets of Ranada,
including its prepaid insurance that had been obtained from Houston
General through its agent, Smyers. This liability policy showed Ranada as
the named insured. Four days before the expiration of the policy, an acci-
dent occurred that resulted in a lawsuit. The insurer refused to defend
Lane Wood in the suit, which resulted in a substantial judgment. Lane
Wood in turn brought suit against Houston General for the amount of the
judgment plus defense costs and against the insurer's local recording agent,
Smyers, for negligence in failing to maintain or secure coverage.
Subsequent to the purchase of Ranada's assets, Lane Wood continued to
hold out the operation to the public as Ranada. Smyers was aware that
Ranada had sold out, but he assumed it to be a stock sale. Houston Gen-
eral's records indicated that it learned of the sale approximately four
months before the accident. Even after learning of the sale, Smyers and
his employees continued to service the policies, and Houston General paid
other claims for property damage under the policy and also paid some
workers' compensation claims.
The court held that Houston General was estopped to deny coverage
and that their ignorance that the sale was of assets and not stock did not
defeat Lane Wood's cause of action. The court also held that Houston
General had constructive knowledge of the facts.72 Houston General and
its local recording agent had notice of the facts sufficient to put it on in-
quiry as to the nature of the sale. They did not inquire and continued to
accept premium payments and to service the insurance.73
The court of civil appeals also affirmed the judgment against the agent,
Smyers, who contended that Lane Wood did not rely upon him as its in-
surance agent during the policy period and had no course of dealing with
him that would entitle Lane Wood to rely on him. Smyers contended that
in order to impose a duty upon an agent, the agent must ordinarily provide
insurance protection for the client without consulting with the client. The
court disagreed, however, and held that Smyers had a duty to investigate
the sale and was charged with notice that the sale was an asset sale. This
was particularly true since Smyers admitted that he wondered whether
coverage was still in force after he found out that Ranada had sold OUt.74
70. 571 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, no writ).
71. This clause provided: "Assignment of interest under this policy shall not bind the
company until its consent is endorsed hereon." Id. at 388.
72. The court observed that:
Where a person, with actual or constructive knowledge of the facts, induces
another by his words or conduct to believe that he acquiesces in or ratifies a
transaction, or that he will offer no opposition thereto, and that other, in reli-
ance on such belief, alters his position, such person is estopped from repudiat-
ing the transaction to the other's prejudice.
Id. at 389 (quoting Champlin Oil & Ref. Co. v. Chastain, 403 S.W.2d 376, 385-86 (Tex.
1965) (emphasis added by the court)).
73. 571 S.W.2d at 389-90.
74. Id. at 392-93.
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Smyers further contended that the rule requiring expert testimony to es-
tablish the standard of care in medical malpractice cases should also be
applied to insurance agents. No expert testimony was introduced in this
case to establish a standard of care. The court, however, held that expert
testimony was not required as to the normal and customary practice when
an agent finds out that there has been a sale by the corporation insured
under the policy. This is a matter within the realm of ordinary skill and
diligence.75
II. PROPERTY INSURANCE
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Chance76 involved the admissibility of evidence
to determine the value of household goods destroyed in a fire. The insured
had brought an action to recover damages for household goods and a
dwelling covered by a fire insurance policy. She prepared a list of house-
hold goods showing the item, the approximate cost, the age of the item,
and where it was purchased. The trial court allowed the list in evidence,
and the jury awarded the insured $6,000 for loss to household goods. The
court of civil appeals held that the mere approximate cost of an item of
personal property was not proper or competent evidence to prove the ac-
tual cash value of the items at the time of loss.77 The court further held
that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover attorneys' fees pursuant to
article 3.62 of the Insurance Code under a fire insurance policy.78 The
supreme court in a per curiam opinion reversed and rendered.79 The court
held that the list and testimony of the insured were admissible under well
established Texas case law.8 ° The supreme court stated the rule as follows:
Thus, the rule is that where household goods have no recognized mar-
ket value, the trier of fact may consider, in determining the actual
value to the owner at the time of loss, the original cost, the cost of
replacement, opinions of qualified witnesses, including the owner, the
use to which the property was put, as well as any other reasonably
relevant facts.8
The court added that the court of civil appeals correctly held that the in-
sured was not entitled to recovery of attorneys' fees under article 3.62.82
In Ormsby v. Travelers Indemnity Co. 8 3 the court was faced with defin-
ing the term "explosion" in a homeowner's property damage policy. The
plaintiff had discovered a broken copper water line that had apparently
burst on one side, causing substantial water damage to the inside of his
75. Id. at 394-95.
76. 582 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979), writ refd n.r.e per curiam, 23
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 60 (Nov. 7, 1979).
77. 582 S.W.2d at 531.
78. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.62 (Vernon 1963) provides as a penalty that the insurer
must pay attorneys' fees if it delays payment on a claim, but this provision is inapplicable to
fire insurance. 582 S.W.2d at 533-34.
79. 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 60 (Nov. 7, 1979).
80. See Crisp v. Security Nat'l Ins. Co., 369 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. 1963).
81. 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 60.
82. Id. at 61.
83. 573 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ).
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house, and assumed that the pipe had frozen and burst, flooding the house.
The policy insured against damages caused by an explosion. The insur-
ance company contended that this was not an explosion as that term is
defined in article 5.52 of the Texas Insurance Code.8 4 Prior to allowing the
plaintiff to put on his expert, the court instructed a verdict for the defend-
ant.
The expert would have testified that a domestic hot water heater, such as
was involved in the instant case, was neither a fired pressure vessel nor an
unfired pressure vessel, which meant that the burst copper pipe in question
was not connected to any boiler or vessel that would fall within the exclu-
sion in article 5.52. The court stated that the definition to be applied to
"explosion" was to be construed as understood by ordinary men and that
there was a jury question as to whether the instant occurrence was the
result of an explosion.85
In Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Murphy8 6 the
insured brought suit against the company to recover under an inland
marine cargo policy for damages suffered as the result of a theft. The in-
sured had purchased sporting apparel from a Mexican manufacturer and
had arranged to accept delivery of the goods in San Antonio. Prior to
going to San Antonio, he purchased the policy in question, which con-
tained a theft endorsement covering the shipment. There was no coverage
for loss or damage to any shipment under the control of the insured after
the transporting vehicle had remained in any dock, depot, station, or ter-
minal for more than seventy-two hours after the arrival of the vehicle at
such location. Upon arrival in San Antonio from Houston the insured
checked into a motel and rented a truck. Later that evening he transferred
the goods from the Mexican manufacturer's vehicle to the truck, parked
the truck in the motel parking lot, padlocked it, and retired to his room for
the night. The truck was broken into during the night, and the goods were
taken. The company contended that the goods were not in transit, but the
jury found to the contrary and judgment was entered for the plaintiff. The
court of civil appeals affirmed, holding that where a policy provision is
ambiguous, the interpretation most favorable to the insured will be
adopted. The apparel was held to be in transit as long as the property was
in the course of being delivered to the place to which it was being
shipped.87
In Hochheim Prairie Farm Mutual Insurance Association v. Campion
88
84. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.52 (Vernon 1963). The relevant portion of this article
states:
The term "explosion" as used above shall not include insurance against loss of
or damage to any property of the insured, resulting from the explosion of or
injury to (a) any boiler, heater, or other fired pressure vessel; (b) any unfired
pressure vessel; (c) pipes or containers connected with any of said boilers or
vessels ....
85. 573 S.W.2d at 284.
86. 579 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
87. Id. at 61-62.
88. 581 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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the plaintiff had obtained a policy from the defendant that provided for
coverage against loss due to various causes, including hail. Although the
policy had been issued, the work on the insured buildings had not been
completed when a severe hail storm damaged both the roofs and the sides
of the structures. The builder replaced the roofs free of charge, and the
insurance company pleaded this as a mitigation of the damages. The trial
court refused to allow introduction of evidence on this point. The court of
civil appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. The court held "in-
surance against loss, as opposed to a contract to pay on the happening of a
certain event to be one for indemnity."89 The purpose of a contract of
indemnity is to insure against actual pecuniary loss sustained by the in-
sured.90
In Rogers v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.9 1 the plaintiff was in the proc-
ess of having a poolhouse constructed. The construction of the poolhouse
was approximately ninety-nine percent complete at the time a fire broke
out, severely damaging the structure. The plaintiff was covered under a
homeowner's policy that provided for coverage for dwelling extensions
"used in connection with the occupancy of the dwelling.",92 Aetna con-
tended that the policy did not provide coverage because the construction
had not reached a sufficient stage of completion. The court held that the
test to determine commencement of coverage under the dwelling extension
clause was when the structure had reached a sufficient stage of completion
so as to be capable of use for the purposes for which it was constructed. In
the instant case, gear was stored therein, appliances were connected, and
the pool heater was in operation. The only things remaining to be done
were the finishing touches, such as a few plumbing hookups and installa-
tion of some larger pieces of furniture. Thus, the poolhouse had reached
the stage of completion necessary to satisfy the test.
93
Aetna further contended that the insured did not comply with the policy
provision requiring the filing of a proof of loss. Substantial compliance
with this provision is necessary and a condition precedent to coverage.
Aetna was notified of the loss on the morning after the accident, at which
time the insured indicated that he would not be making a claim under the
policy. He subsequently changed his mind, however, and Aetna's investi-
gators were at the scene on at least two different occasions. Also, within a
two-month period after the fire Aetna received five letters from the insured
detailing all information necessary for the claim. Aetna did not object to
the proof of loss at any time during its negotiations. The court held that
the proof of loss filed by the insured was sufficient. Furthermore, when
defective proofs of loss are furnished a company, it must, within a reason-
able time, object to such proofs so that the insured can cure such defects.
89. Id. at 257 (emphasis by the court).
90. Id.
91. 601 F.2d 840 (5th Cir. 1979).
92. Id. at 842 n.l.
93. Id. at 843-44.
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Otherwise, the company waives this defect.94 The court further held, con-
trary to Aetna's contention, that a proof of loss does not evidence the ex-
tent of loss and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages even
though they were greater than shown in the proof of loss, the dispute hav-
ing been one of evaluation.95
Legislative Changes. Article 5.46(A) of the Insurance Code9 6 was amended
by the 1979 Legislature. Pursuant to the amendment, any peace officer of
any political subdivision may request and receive from an insurance com-
pany investigating a fire loss of real or personal property in excess of
$1,000, the following information: Any insurance policy relevant to the
fire loss; policy premium payment records; history of previous claims made
by the insured for fire loss; material relating to the investigation of the loss
including statements; proof of loss or other relevant evidence. 97
Prior to the 1977 amendment, article 5.46 provided that no action taken
by the state fire marshal in investigating a fire could affect the rights of a
policy holder. 98 In addition, the results of any investigation could not be
given in evidence in any civil action, nor could any statement by any insur-
ance company, officers, agents, or adjusters of any policy holder made to
the fire marshal be admitted in any civil action for damages.
The 1977 amendment totally changed the thrust of this statute and pro-
vided that any fire marshal, state or local, and any chief of any established
fire department could be required to testify as to any information in his
possession regarding the cause of a fire loss in any civil action for damages
against an insurance company.99 The 1977 Act further provided that an
insurance company shall notify fire investigation authorities of a suspected
incendiary fire,"° and in the absence of fraud or malice is not liable for
damages in a civil action or subject to criminal prosecution for furnishing
information or taking any other action necessary to supply information
pursuant to this section.' The 1979 amendment made only one change,
that being to add the term "any peace officer in Texas" to those who may
request information from insurance companies.
III. LIFE, HEALTH, AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE
Misrepresentations and Waiver. In Washington v. Reliable Life Insurance
Co. 102 the supreme court addressed questions concerning (1) validity of a
94. Id. at 844-45.
95. The value of items that are not claimed on the proof of loss, however, cannot be
recovered. Commercial Union Assur. Co. v. Preston, 115 Tex. 351, 282 S.W. 563 (1926).
96. 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 515, § i, at 1099 (Vernon).
97. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.46 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1979).
98. Id. art. 5.46 (Vernon 1963).
99. Id. art. 5.46(E) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1979).
100. Id. art. 5.46(B). The insurance company is also required to provide the same infor-
mation as is currently required by the 1979 amendment to article 5.46. See note 97 supra
and accompanying text.
101. Id. art. 5.46(C).
102. 581 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. 1979).
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release signed by the beneficiary, (2) waiver of the good health clause, and
(3) misrepresentation. Three $1,000 life insurance policies were purchased
from the defendant by A.W. Washington, insuring his mother four months
before her death. They were purchased from two agents and had different
provisions, and different facts applied to each policy.' 3
The evidence was clear that for the four and one-half months preceding
the death of the insured, she was very sick and was being treated for vari-
ous maladies including congestive heart failure. She was in a hospital
from September 16 to October 11, 1974, and upon her discharge went to
the home of A.W. Washington. At that time she signed applications for
Policies A and B, which were issued respectively on October 21 and Octo-
ber 15. Shortly thereafter she moved into the home of her sister, Viola
Smith, where she was visited by agent Jones, and an application for Policy
C was taken, which was issued on October 28. Her condition deteriorated,
and she died in January 1975.
In April 1975 agent Armstrong called upon A.W. Washington and per-
suaded him to sign a release form in exchange for the return of the premi-
ums paid on Policies A and B. No such release was ever taken on Policy
C. The check was issued, but Washington refused to cash the check,
mailed it back, and demanded full payment under the policies. By return
letter Reliable stated that it was voiding the check because it should have
named the Jackson Funeral Home as co-payee. Reliable further refused to
make payment upon Policy C, and thereafter Washington filed suit. The
trial court, based on the jury verdict, entered judgment for the beneficiary.
The court of civil appeals reversed."°
The supreme court distinguished Great Southern Life Insurance Co. v.
Heavin,10 5 noting that in Heavin the policy specifically allowed a return of
premiums instead of benefits, which was not true in the instant case. Fur-
ther, in Heavin the beneficiary accepted and kept the money tendered
whereas, in this case, Washington returned the check and demanded full
payment. Moreover, Reliable voided the check and never tendered a cor-
rect check to Washington. Therefore, as a matter of law, there was a fail-
ure of consideration to support the release.
10 6
103. The Supreme Court charted the policy provisions as follows:
Application
Good Health Covered By Attached to
Policy Agent Provision Release Policy
A Armstrong Yes Yes No
B Armstrong No Yes Yes
C Jones Yes No No
Id. at 155.
104. 570 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978).
105. 39 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, holding approved). The court in Heavin
held that the repayment to the beneficiary of the amount of the premium paid on a life
policy and the acceptance of such premium with full acknowledgement that the repayment
was in full payment of all claims under the policy would bar recovery in the absence of a
valid defense. Id. at 852.
106. 581 S.W.2d at 157.
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Policies A and C contained identical good health clauses. '0 7 The parties
stipulated that the insured was not in good health within the meaning of
the terms of the two policies on their effective date. The beneficiary al-
leged, however, that the company had waived the good health clauses as a
matter of law because the agents knew that the insured was not in good
health at the time the applications were procured. No special issues were
requested or submitted to the jury on this point. Consequently, the benefi-
ciary was required to prove as a matter of law that waiver was estab-
lished.' The testimony indicated that at the time the application for
Policy A was obtained by agent Armstrong, he was not aware that the
prospective insured was not in good health and, in fact, believed she
looked pretty good at the time. Consequently, this testimony failed to es-
tablish as a matter of law that the agent knew the prospective insured was
not in good health. With regard to Policy C, however, agent Jones did not
testify although the sister of the deceased testified that the insured looked
"durn near dead."' 0 9 The sister further testified that she told the insured
in the presence of the agent that the insured would not be accepted for
coverage because of her poor health, but the agent stated that the insur-
ance company would pay. The supreme court, based on the foregoing tes-
timony, held as a matter of law that Reliable had waived the good health
provision of Policy C."'
At the trial of the case, although Reliable had submitted issues regard-
ing misrepresentations both to agents Armstrong and Jones, the jury failed
to find that the deceased had made misrepresentations concerning her
health to either agent. Consequently, issues 2 through 5 dealing with
whether the representations were related to material facts relied upon by
the company and made by the insured with intent to deceive were not
answered. Since the applications were not attached to either Policy A or
C, this misrepresentation point had no application to these policies."'
Since the application was attached to Policy B, it would be grounds for
voiding the policy if the jury found that the insured intentionally tried to
deceive the company, but the jury did not reach that issue in this case.
Based on the numerous foregoing findings, the court held that the benefici-
ary was not entitled to recover under Policy A and that the causes of action
107. The good health clause provided: "This Policy shall become effective on the Policy
Date if the Insured is then alive and in good health, but not otherwise." Id.
108. Waiver is an affirmative defense upon which the beneficiary has the burden of
proof. Texas Prudential Ins. Co. v. Dillard, 153 Tex. 15, 307 S.W.2d 242 (1957).
109. 581 S.W.2d at 158.
110. The court applied the rule established in Collora v. Navarro, 574 S.W.2d 65 (Tex.
1978). That court stated that evidence given by an interested witness raises an issue of credi-
bility upon which the jury must pass. An exception may arise when the testimony is clear,
direct, and positive, is free from internal inconsistencies or contradictions, and is uncontra-
dicted by other testimony or circumstances. Id. at 69.
I11. When an application is attached to and made a part of the policy and is accepted
and retained by the insured, the insured is presumed to have knowledge of its contents and
to have ratified any false statements in the application. 581 S.W.2d at 160 (quoting Odom v.
Insurance Co., 455 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. 1970)).
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as to Policies B and C should be reversed and remanded to the trial court
for a new trial.
Coverage. Bomar v. Trinity National Life & Accident Insurance Co. 112 in-
volved the validity of a policy provision limiting coverage. The insurer
issued a major medical policy to Thomas Bomar effective July 10, 1976, to
July 10, 1977. At that time his daughter was living at home; she married,
however, shortly after the effective date of the policy. In January 1977 she
was hospitalized, and a claim for medical benefits was made. The claim
was refused by the insurance company. The policy provided coverage for
dependent members of the insured's family, including unmarried children.
Coverage of unmarried children terminated upon marriage or attaining
the age of twenty-four years.
The trial court held that this provision was ineffective under articles
3.70-4 and 3.70--7 of the Texas Insurance Code.11 3 Article 3.70-4(b)
provides that the provisions of the Insurance Code govern when the policy
provisions conflict with any provision of the Code. 14 Article 3.70-7 pro-
vides that if a policy contains a provision terminating coverage on the ba-
sis of age limit or otherwise within a period for which a premium is
accepted by the insurer, the coverage provided by the policy will continue
in force." 5 The supreme court, reversing the court of civil appeals," 6
agreed with the trial court and held that the term "or otherwise" in the
Code necessarily overruled the language of the policy that would termi-
nate the coverage upon marriage of a child. The policy coverage therefore
continued in force and the insurer was liable for the medical benefits.
Lfe Insurance Co. v. Overstreet 1 7 involved the determination of the ef-
fective date of a life insurance policy. On March 15, 1972, the company
issued an endowment policy on the life of Maxie Overstreet, showing
March 15 as the effective date of the policy. On April 13, 1972, a check
was forwarded for the premium, which the company received on April 17
and applied on April 18. On April 15, 1973, the Overstreets had not paid
the premium for the second year, and the policy was terminated. It was
later reinstated because the premium was paid on April 25, 1973. On April
24, 1974, Maxie Overstreet died. The insurance company maintained that
the third-year premium was due on March 15, 1974, the anniversary date
of the effective date as stated in the policy. Since the thirty-one-day grace
112. 579 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. 1979).
113. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. arts. 3.70-4, -7 (Vernon 1963).
114. Id. art. 3.70-4(b).
115. Id. art. 3.70-7 states:
If any such policy contains a provision establishing, as an age limit or other-
wise, a date after which the coverage provided by the policy will not be effec-
tive, and if such date falls within a period for which premium is accepted by
the insurer or if the insurer accepts the premium after such date, the coverage
provided by the policy will continue in force subject to any right of cancella-
tion until the end of the period for which premium has been accepted.
(Emphasis added.)
116. 572 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978).
117. 580 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, writ granted).
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period commenced on that date and expired on April 15, 1974, the death
fell outside that period. The beneficiary contended that the date of the
premium payments determined the effective date of the policy.
The trial court found that the policy became effective April 18, 1972,
and consequently annual premiums were due each April 18 thereafter.
Therefore, the policy was in effect because the insured died within the
thirty-one-day grace period. The court of civil appeals affirmed, holding
that where the stated effective date of a policy is intended to be different
from the date on which coverage became effective, it must be clearly stated
in the policy. 18 The supreme court has granted writ of error." 9
In Empire Life Insurance Co. v. Moody 20 the question as to insurable
interest in the life of the insured was before the court. Shearn Moody, Jr.
was the principal stockholder, chief executive officer, president, and chair-
man of the board of Empire Life Insurance Company of America. Moody
owned an undivided one-eighth life estate in the income from a trust cre-
ated by the will of Libbie Shearn Moody. He assigned to Empire full and
complete title to forty percent of his undivided one-eighth life estate.
Under accounting principles, Empire could not carry its interest in the
trust as an asset of the company except to the extent that its value was
covered by insurance on the life of Moody, since the income would neces-
sarily terminate upon his death. For the purposes of making his trust an
asset of Empire, Moody applied for and obtained life insurance from three
different companies in the sum of $12,000,000. After Empire became the
beneficiary of the policies, it carried the Moody life estate interest as an
asset at values that ranged from $14,213,440 in 1965 to $4,250,000 in 1975.
In 1972 Empire experienced serious financial difficulties and was placed
in receivership. Subsequently, Empire reached an agreement with Protec-
tive Life Insurance Company under a Treaty of Assumption and Bulk Re-
insurance. Empire was required to transfer to Protective all of its assets
except $2,000,000. Empire also agreed to assign to Protective $4,350,000 of
the proceeds from the life insurance policy. Shearn Moody filed suit to
have the assignment of the insurance policy proceeds declared void be-
cause Protective did not have an insurable interest in his life. The trial
court entered a judgment for Empire and Protective. The court of civil
appeals dismissed the case,12 stating that this was not a justiciable contro-
versy under the Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act.' 22 The
supreme court held that there was a justiciable controversy and then ex-
amined the insurable interest question.
The court held that Protective owned by assignment a life interest in the
Moody Trust, a major asset of Empire, from which substantial income had
been received during the years of ownership. Because the income would
now be paid to Protective until Moody's death, Protective had a present
118. Id. at 933.
119. 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 5 (Oct. 3, 1979).
120. 584 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1979).
121. 570 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978).
122. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2524-1 (Vernon 1965).
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insurable interest in the life of Moody to the extent of the asset value as-
signed.' 23 It has been held that three classes of persons have an insurable
interest in the life of another: (1) someone so closely related by blood or
affinity that he or she wants the other to continue to live, irrespective of
monetary considerations; (2) a creditor; and (3) one having a reasonable
expectation of pecuniary benefit or advantage from the continued life of
another. 124 The court added that its decision was supported by Texas In-
surance Code article 3.39,121 which states that a life insurance company
may invest in certain life income interests, provided satisfactory evidence
is presented that the interest is supported by life insurance in an amount
not less than its admitted value.
The court also held that Empire continued to have an insurable interest
under article 3.49-1.26 In this instance Moody applied for the policy in
question and designated Empire as the beneficiary and owner. Under the
provisions of the statute, Empire as the beneficiary and owner thereafter
had an insurable interest. 127
Aetna L!fe Insurance Co. v. Bocanegra 28 involved an election of reme-
dies between health insurance benefits and workers' compensation bene-
fits. The plaintiff was hospitalized in 1975 while employed by Clegg
Company. During her hospitalization she filed a claim for workers' com-
pensation benefits, alleging a work related injury. The workers' compensa-
tion carrier disputed liability but subsequently settled the claim for $12,000
for lost wages and impaired future earning capacity.
The plaintiff then filed this action against her health insurance carrier to
recover her medical expenses under the group policy held by her em-
ployer, this time alleging a nonoccupational injury or disease. Judgment
was rendered for the plaintiff. The court of civil appeals held that since the
plaintiff had recovered workers' compensation benefits on the grounds that
her injury was work related, the doctrine of election of remedies now pre-
cluded her recovery of medical expenses under the allegation of a nonoc-
cupational disease or injury. The court added that the plaintiff should not
be permitted to assert formally the existence of one state of facts in a claim
against one party, accepting benefits in satisfaction of that claim, and then
maintain an action against another party on the ground that the facts first
123. Drane v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 139 Tex. 101, 161 S.W.2d 1057 (1942).
124. Id. at 104-05, 161 S.W.2d at 1058-59.
125. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.39 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1979).
126. Id. art. 3.49-1 (Vernon 1963). Section I provides:
Any person of legal age may apply for insurance on his life in any legal re-
serve or mutual assessment life insurance company and in such application
designate in writing any person, persons, partnership, association, corporation
or other legal entity, or any combination thereof, as the beneficiary or benefi-
ciaries, or the absolute or partial owner or owners, or both beneficiary and
owner, of any policy or policies issued in connection with such application;
and with respect to any such policy or policies any such beneficiary or owner
so designated shall at all times thereafter have an insurable interest in the life
of such person ....
127. 584 S.W.2d at 860.
128. 572 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, writ granted).
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asserted did not exist. The supreme court has granted a writ of error on
the question of the doctrine of election of remedies. 2 9
In Freeman v. Crown Life Insurance Co. 130 the beneficiary brought suit
seeking recovery of accidental death benefits under a group policy for
death of the insured, who was killed in an automobile collision while driv-
ing under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The policy provided for
recovery of benefits for accidental bodily injuries, which were not defined
in the policy. There was no intoxication exclusion. The insurance com-
pany refused to pay the accidental death benefits on the ground that the
insured's voluntary act of driving while intoxicated rendered his death
nonaccidental. The trial court agreed.
The appeals court observed that in a suit to recover accidental death
benefits, proof that the insured died by violent and external means raises a
presumption that the death was accidental.' 3 ' This presumption, however,
is rebuttable.' 32 The only evidence upon which the company relied to re-
but the presumption that the death was accidental was a stipulation that at
the time of the collision the deceased was driving while intoxicated. The
company contended that since such an act is a criminal act, inherently
involving substantial risk of harm, death is a readily foreseeable conse-
quence and is therefore not accidental within the contemplation of the pol-
icy. 133
The court held that the mere fact that a person's death may have oc-
curred because of his negligence does not prevent the death from being
accidental within the terms of an accident policy.' 34 It is only when the
consequences of an act are so natural and probable as to be expected by
any reasonable person that it can be said that the victim, in effect, intends
the result and therefore it is not accidental. The insured must have known
or anticipated that his conduct would, in all probability, bring about his
death. ' The court stated that although driving while intoxicated was a
serious violation of the law and extremely dangerous, it was not an act that
the violater could reasonably know would result in his own death. 136
The insurance company also relied upon decisions holding that the
death or injury of a person that occurs while such person is engaged in the
commission of a serious crime is not accidental within the meaning of an
insurance policy. 137 The court distinguished these cases on the grounds
129. 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 476 (July 5, 1979).
130. 580 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
131. Id. at 899 (citing Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Heyward, 536 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.
1976)).
132. Home Benefit Ass'n v. Briggs, 61 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1933, no
writ).
133. The company relied on Hobbs v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 535 S.W.2d
864, 866-67 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975) to support its contention. The court noted that the major-
ity rule is to the contrary, citing Miller v. American Cas. Co., 377 F.2d 479 (6th Cir. 1967.
134. 580 S.W.2d at 900.
135. Id. (citing Hutcherson v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 112 Tex. 551, 251 S.W. 491
(1923)).
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., Ritchie v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 521 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Civ.
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that in each of these instances the conduct of the insured was such that
death was invited, expected, imminent, and foreseeable. It was not the
illegality of the act but the inevitability of the result that controlled. The
court added that the weight of authority and the trend of recent decisions
allows the innocent beneficiary to recover unless the policy was obtained
in contemplation of the illegal conduct. 38 The court added that there was
no proof that the deceased's intoxication had any causal relationship to his
death. All that was proven was that he had been intoxicated and killed in
an accident. Thus, even if the court were to hold that the act of driving
while intoxicated rendered the resulting death nonaccidental, it must still
be proven that such intoxication did, in fact, cause or contribute to the
death. 139
The last coverage case is Kentucky Central Life Insurance Co. v. Fan-
nin. 4 The beneficiary brought suit to recover unpaid accidental death
benefits from three life insurance policies and an automobile accidental
death policy. The insurance company contended that the life insurance
benefits were not payable since the death resulted from suicide. The policy
excluded accidental death benefits if death by suicide occurred within two
years after the date of the issuance of the policy. The automobile acciden-
tal death policy excluded benefits unless the loss of life resulted from bod-
ily injuries directly and independently of all other causes and was not
caused or contributed to by suicide. The jury found that the death was the
result of an accident and not suicide. The trial court entered judgment for
the beneficiary, and the court of civil appeals affirmed.
The appeals court found no evidence that the deceased was in ill health
or that she ever had indicated any propensity toward self-destruction. Her
sister-in-law testified that they had previously discussed death, at which
time the deceased had indicated that she would use a gun if she were going
to commit suicide, because people frequently do not die in car wrecks.
Further, she testified that her sister was very much afraid of pain. Her
family testified that the deceased was a careful driver and had never driven
over eighty miles an hour. On the day of her death she asked her son, his
friend, and her unmarried daughter to go with her to the grocery store.
Only her daughter accepted. The deceased did not drive directly to the
grocery store but drove in an opposite direction. She and her daughter
talked and laughed as she drove. The deceased laughed deeper and more
continuously than her daughter had ever heard, but her daughter attrib-
uted this to a joke she had told her mother. During the trip the car reached
speeds of up to 110 miles an hour. The daughter asked her mother to slow
down, which she did, but then she slowly accelerated again. They were on
App.-Waco 1975, no writ) (insured injured during a burglary); Spencer v. Southland Life
Ins. Co., 340 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1960, writ ref'd) (insured killed by
police officer when insured drew shotgun from truck).
138. 580 S.W.2d at 901; see American Mut. Benefit Ass'n v. Joshua, 200 S.W. 260 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1918, no writ); Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 1120, 1126, § 4 (1972).
139. 580 S.W.2d at 901.
140. 575 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, no writ).
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a road which, to the family's knowledge, the deceased had never previ-
ously driven. They were approaching a stop sign at this high rate of speed
when the car hit a dip in the road, became airborne and came to rest 519
feet from where it had left the road. The insured was killed, but her
daughter survived. The investigating officer concurred With the daughter's
estimated speed of 100 miles an hour and stated that such a speed would
be unsafe on that road.
The insurer asserted that since the deceased was voluntarily and inten-
tionally operating her vehicle in excess of 100 miles an hour approaching
an intersection, it was inconceivable that she would not anticipate that she
might receive injuries that would result in her death. Consequently, the
death was not accidental. The court examined the evidence in light of
Republic National Lfe Insurance Co. P. Heyward.'4' The court in that case
held that injuries are accidental,
if from the viewpoint of the insured, the injuries are not the natural
and probable consequence of the action or occurrence which pro-
duced the injury; or in other words, if the injury could not reasonably
be anticipated by insured, or would not ordinarily follow from the
action or occurrence which caused the injury. 14 2
The court stated that there is a presumption of self-preservation. There is
nothing in the act of driving at an excessive rate of speed and failing to
stop at a stop sign, though both are violations of the law, that could per se
be calculated to produce bodily injury or death. This may occur, but it is
not logical that death is a natural consequence of either act. Since the
deceased had not previously traveled the road and was not aware of the
dip, she could not reasonably have anticipated the unexpected danger the
dip represented. Consequently, there was sufficient evidence to support
the jury's finding on this issue.' 43
The insurance company next contended that there was a failure to show
that death resulted directly, and independently of all other causes, from
bodily injuries received in an automobile collision. The insured argued
that the cause of death was not established by a death certificate or medi-
cal testimony, and thus there was no competent evidence of the true cause
of death. The court held that the true cause of death may be established
by circumstantial evidence.' 44 The deceased was alive before the car
wreck and immediately thereafter she was dead, with her body broken up
and demolished. Despite the fact that the deceased had high blood pres-
sure and was overweight, from the evidence the jury could reasonably con-
clude that these conditions did not materially contribute to her death, and
that the death was a direct result of injuries received in the automobile
accident. 145
Lastly, the company asserted that the beneficiary had not proven that
141. 536 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1976).
142. Id. at 557.
143. 575 S.W.2d at 80-81.
144. Id. at81.
145. Id. at 82.
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the death was not a result of suicide. The court stated, however, that the
evidence submitted did not rebut the presumption against suicide. The
fact that she was driving at 110 miles an hour and disregarded the stop
sign intentionally did not rebut the presumption. The test is not whether
the actions of the deceased were intentional but whether the happening
that produced the accident resulting in the death was intentionally or acci-
dentally encountered. 1
46
Legislative Changes. During 1979 the legislature first amended the Medi-
cal Assistance Act of 1967147 and then repealed the Act by enacting the
Human Resources Code, 4 1 which retains the same general purpose of the
original Act, namely to enable the state to provide medical assistance on
behalf of needy individuals and to enable the state to obtain all benefits for
those persons provided by the Federal Social Security ActI49 or any other
federal act with funds available for such purposes. ' 50 Section 32.024 of the
Human Resources Code provides for a broadening of the eligibility re-
quirement for medical assistance by including persons who receive
financial assistance from the state, as well as other related groups of per-
sons for whom medical assistance is required by federal law 15 ' and other
persons financially unable to meet the cost of medical services, if federal
matching funds are available. 152 The previous eligibility provision in sec-
tion 8 of the Medical Assistance Act had been modified by a 1979 amend-
ment 5 3 to include a notice provision. The amendment provided that any
person who applied for or received medical assistance was required to in-
form the Department of Public Welfare at the time of the application, or at
any time during eligibility and receipt of services, of any unsettled tort
claim that might affect medical needs and of any private accident or sick-
ness insurance coverage that might become available.' 54 The appli-
cant/recipient also had to inform the department of any injury requiring
medical attention that was caused by the act or omission of some other
person.' 55 This notice provision was retained in section 32 of the Human
Resources Code.
156
The Code also retains the subrogation provision of the original Act by
providing in section 32.033 for subrogation of the Department of Public
Welfare to the recipient's right of recovery for personal injuries caused by
the negligence or wrong of another person 151 to the extent the medical care
146. Id.
147. 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 151, §§ 1-24, at 310.
148. TEX. HUMAN RESOURCES CODE §§ 1.001-121.009 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1979).
149. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d (1976).
150. TEX. HUMAN RESOURCES CODE § 32.001 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1979).
151. Id. § 32.024(a).
152. Id. § 32.024(b).
153. 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 783, § 2, at 1987 (Vernon).
154. Id. at 1986.
155. Id.
156. TEX. HUMAN RESOURCES CODE § 32.033(b) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1979).
157. Id. § 32.033(a).
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services were paid for or rendered by the state.'58 The Code continues to
provide that the recipient's claim for damages for the personal injury are
not grounds for denying or discontinuing medical assistance. 1
59
The legislature also passed two other provisions 60 directly affecting ac-
cident and sickness insurance policies that are issued subject to chapter 20
of the Texas Insurance Code. 161 The legislature provided in article
21.49-9 that no individual or group accident or sickness insurance policy
may include a provision that excludes or limits coverage of the insurer
from paying benefits covered by the Medical Assistance Act. Article
21.49-10 states that each individual or group accident or sickness insur-
ance policy shall provide for payment to the Texas Department of Human
Resources for the actual cost of medical expense the department pays
through medical assistance, if the insured is entitled to payments for the
medical expenses by the insurance contract.
In 1977 the legislature passed Texas Insurance Code article 21.52,162
providing that the insured under a health insurance policy 63 could use the
services of a doctor of podiatric medicine 164 when the medical or surgical
procedures scheduled in the policy were within the scope of the license of
that doctor. The Act went on to provide that there could be no classifica-
tion, differentation, or discrimination in the payment schedule or payment
provisions between the services performed by a doctor of podiatric
medicine and the same services provided by other medical practitioners
whose services were covered by the policy. Any policy provision to the
contrary is invalid. In 1979, the legislature amended article 21.52 and
added to this list of approved practitioners doctors of optometry' 65 and
doctors of chiropractic. 
166
IV. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES AND THE INSURANCE CODE
Several cases involving deceptive trade practices as related to insurance
law were decided during this survey period, including the supreme court
opinion in Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Bar Consultants, Inc. 167 The
158. Id. § 32.033(e).
159. Id. § 32.033(c).
160, TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.49-9 to -10 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1979).
161. These provisions were effective September 1, 1979, and apply to all accident and
sickness policies issued, delivered, renewed, extended, or amended on or after January 1,
1980.
162. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.52 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1979).
163. Section I(a) defines a health insurance policy as: "any individual, group, blanket,
or franchise insurance policy, insurance agreement, or group hospital contract, providing
benefits for medical or surgical expenses incurred as a result of an accident or sickness."
164. Section 1(a) includes a: "D.P.M., podiatrist, doctor of surgical chiropody, D.S.C.,
and chiropodist."
165. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.52; § 1(c) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1979). Included
are the optometrist, doctor of optometry, and O.D.
166. This was defined to mean one licensed by the Texas Board of Chiropractic Examin-
ers to practice chiropractic. Id. § I(d).
167. 577 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. 1979), af/'g 566 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978). A
discussion of the court of appeals decision was included in Krebs, Insurance Law, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 303, 327 (1979).
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plaintiff was insured under a policy that provided only limited coverage
for vandalism and malicious mischief. This was a renewal of earlier iden-
tical policies. The insured testified that prior to the first policy's being
written, he had a lengthy conversation with the agent and was assured that
he had total coverage for vandalism. Immediately after such loss occurred,
the agent and his secretary confirmed that the damage was covered under
the policy. The insured undertook the necessary repairs. Subsequently,
Royal Globe denied the claim.
At trial Royal Globe contended that the agent had no authority to make
statements and representations that were binding upon Royal Globe. The
trial court found, however, that the agent was at all times an agent for
Royal Globe as that term is defined in article 21.02 of the Texas Insurance
Code. '6 The court also held that the agent, by his statements that all
damages were covered, committed a deceptive trade practice. The court of
civil appeals affirmed, holding that the agent's statement was a violation of
both article 21.21 of the Insurance Code 169 and section 17.46(b)(12) of the
Deceptive Trade Practices Act.170
The supreme court affirmed on different grounds. The court first looked
at section 16 of article 21.21, which provides that an action may be brought
by any person injured by the deceptive trade practices of another.' 7' Such
practices include those enumerated in section 4 of article 21.21,172 those
declared illegal by the rules and regulations of the Insurance Board, 173 and
those defined by section 17.46 of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. 174
The court stated that the agent in this case was a local recording agent as
that term was defined in article 21.14, section 2.' 7  The court held that
article 21.02176 did not authorize an agent to misrepresent policy coverage
168. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.02 (Vernon 1963).
169. Id. art. 21.21, § 4(I) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1979).
170. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(12) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
171. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1979).
172. This section includes as an unfair trade and deceptive act the misrepresentation and
false advertising of policy contracts, including statements misrepresenting the terms of any
policy issued or to be issued or the benefits or advantages promised thereby.
173. Texas Insurance Board Docket No. 18663, issued on Dec. 3, 1971, declared illegal
those acts done by the insurer, principal, agent, employer, or employee, or anyone acting in
the capacity or connection with the insurer. Further, it declared to be a deceptive act the
misrepresentation of an insurance policy, the making of any untrue statement of material
facts or the omission of same, the making of a statement that may mislead a reasonably
prudent person, a material misstatement of law, or the failure to disclose any matter re-
quired by law to be disclosed.
174. Section 17.46(a) declares as unlawful false, misleading, or deceptive acts or prac-
tices. Section 17.46(b) is a "laundry list" of specific deceptive acts. Section 17.46(b)(12)
prohibits representing that an agreement confers or involves rights, remedies, or obligations
that it does not have or involve.
175. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.14, § 2 (Vernon 1963) defines a local recording agent
as "a person or firm engaged in soliciting and writing insurance, being authorized by an
insurance company. . . to solicit business and to write, sign, execute, and deliver policies of
insurance, and to bind companies on insurance risks .... "
176. Id. art. 21.02 generally provides that anyone who solicits insurance, takes applica-
tions for insurance, and generally acts as an agent shall be held to be the agent of the com-
pany for which the act is done or the risk is taken, as far as it relates to the liabilities, duties,
requirements, and penalties set forth in the Insurance Code.
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and to bind the company to terms contrary to those of the written pol-
icy. 177 A company that authorizes an agent to sell policies, however, may
not escape liability for misrepresentations made in violation of article
21.21 or section 17.46 by establishing that the agent had no actual author-
ity to make such misrepresentations. The court stated that section 1 of the
insurance board regulations 17 includes acts done directly or indirectly, ir-
respective of whether the person is acting as an insurer, principal, agent, or
in any other capacity or connection with the insurer. 179 Further, article
17.46(c)(2)' 80 of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act provides that in con-
struing the Act, the legislature intended that the courts should be guided
by the interpretations of section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act.18' Numerous federal decisions have held that actual authority is not a
defense if the agent is acting within the apparent scope of his authority.'
18 2
The court therefore held that the local recording agent for Royal Globe
had authority under article 21.02 and article 21.14 to sell insurance for the
company and, consequently, to represent the coverage afforded by the pol-
icies. If his representations were false, as the trial court found, these acts
constituted a deceptive trade practice under article 21.21, section 16 of the
Insurance Code and section 17.46(b)(12) of the Deceptive Trade Practices
Act. 183
The insurance carrier also alleged that the insured was not injured and
did not suffer damages as a result of the misrepresentation. The court
agreed that the post-loss representations of coverage did not injure the in-
sured. The evidence was clear that the insured would have repaired the
damages to his building regardless of the post-loss representations. Injury
did occur to the insured, however, by the representation of the agent that
the initial policy provided full coverage for vandalism. The injury was
that the insured believed he was covered by a policy of insurance when in
fact he was not.' 84
The court in S1. Paul Insurance Co. v. Bonded Realty, Inc. 185 confronted
the issue of whether an error and omissions policy provided coverage for
the insured's deceptive trade practices. The insured, a realtor, had com-
mitted two deceptive trade practices in the sale of a house: he had know-
ingly withheld facts regarding a defect in the design and construction of
the roof and had misrepresented the age of the house. The issue presented
was whether such an act was included under the policy that covered negli-
177. 577 S.W.2d at 693.
178. Texas State Board of Insurance, Regulation in Respect to Insurance Trade Practice,
Advertising and Solicitations, Docket No. 18663 (Dec. 3, 1971).
179. 577 S.W.2d at 693.
180. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(c)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
181. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976).
182. See, e.g., Goodman v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1957); Standard Distribs., Inc. v.
FTC, 211 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1954).
183. 577 S.W.2d at 694.
184. Id.




gent acts, errors, and omissions and excluded coverage for dishonesty, in-
tentional fraud, or malicious acts.' 86
The trial court granted summary judgment for the insured; however, the
court of civil appeals reversed, holding that the insured was not insured
against his unlawful acts and that no negligent act or omission had been
proven. The supreme court concurred in the result, but did not agree that
all unlawful acts are necessarily excluded from coverage under the pol-
icy. 18' Thus, the supreme court implied that there will be insurance cover-
age for those acts that are unlawful under the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practice Act, if these acts are not knowing or intentional misrepresenta-
tions. The court of civil appeals did not discuss the question as to the type
of damages, actual damages, treble damages, or attorneys' fees, that might
be covered under the insurance policy.
The plaintiff in General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Leg-
ate188 brought suit under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act18 1 for treble
damages and alternatively under article 3.62-1 of the Insurance Code' 90
for statutory penalty and attorneys' fees. The insured was injured in an
automobile accident and notified his agent. The agent advised him that he
did not have personal injury protection coverage. Two years later, the
agent advised the plaintiffs attorney of the same fact, but three days later
the plaintiffs attorney received a memorandum from the agent stating that
his client did, in fact, have such coverage. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs
counsel filed this suit. The defendant answered and tendered into court
the maximum benefits under that coverage. The trial court entered judg-
ment for treble the policy limits and graduated attorneys' fees, concluding
that the denial of personal injury protection coverage invoked the provi-
sions of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act and Regulation No. 18663 of
the State Board of Insurance.' 9 '
The court of civil appeals reversed and held that the plaintiff was suing
to recover under provisions of a contract of insurance breached by the
defendant upon its denial of coverage. Such denial did not terminate or
lessen the insurer's obligations under the policy and did not extinguish any
of the plaintiffs rights thereunder. The insurer's breach formed the basis
for the institution and maintenance of the suit for the enforcement of the
contractual rights created by the insurance policy. Consequently, the De-
ceptive Trade Practices Act and the Insurance Code were not applica-
186. The policy provided coverage as follows: "To pay on behalf of the Insured all sums
which the Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages arising out of the con-
duct of their business as real estate agents and caused by any negligent act, error or omission
of the Insured." The policy excluded "any dishonesty, intentional fraud, criminal or mali-
cious act." 578 S.W.2d at 192.
187. 583 S.W.2d at 620.
188. 578 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
189. The deceptive trade practice action was brought under TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. §§ 17.46(a), 17.50(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1980) and TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16
(Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1979).
190. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.62-1 (Vernon 1963).
191. See note 173 supra.
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ble.' 92 The court remanded the case to the trial court for a decision as to
whether attorneys' fees and statutory penalties were recoverable under ar-
ticle 3.62-1 of the Insurance Code. 193
Claiming a disability as a result of a fire, the insured in Lone Star Life
Insurance Co. v. Gr/in194 brought suit on a disability policy to collect the
benefits allegedly due. The insured testified that he had been overcome by
smoke inhalation in a fire and was unable to work because of difficulty in
breathing. His doctor testified that as a result of the inhalation of the
smoke and fumes the insured was totally unable to do his work as a phar-
macist. The doctor who examined the insured on behalf of the company
testified that the insured was at worst only partially disabled and attributed
this condition to fifty years of cigarette smoking. He concluded that the
insured could do all the work of a pharmacist but could not do any sus-
tained heavy lifting.
The insurance policy provided that the company would pay the insured
$1,000 per month for sixty months for total disability resulting from an
accidental injury. It would pay $1,000 per month for twenty-four months
for total disability resulting from sickness. Initially, the company paid sev-
eral monthly payments, noting on each check that the payment was for
accidental injuries. Without any additional medical information and for
undisclosed reasons the check code was later changed to indicate that the
disability payment was for sickness and not an accident. The payments
were discontinued after the twenty-fourth payment, and the insured re-
ceived a letter advising him that this was the final and maximum benefit
under the aforementioned disability.' 95 The insured then filed suit for an-
ticipatory breach, asking for payments due under the policy, statutory pen-
alties, attorneys' fees, and treble damages under the Deceptive Trade
Practices Act.
The insurer contended that there was no recission of the policy or re-
fusal to perform. It had only denied that the facts as presented entitled the
insured to recover under the policy. The court of civil appeals stated that
it was clear that the letter sent by the insurer was more than a denial based
upon the facts and found that there was an anticipatory breach. 9 6 The
court also concluded that the trial court erred in finding the insurer had
violated the Deceptive Trade Practices Act because its actions did not con-
stitute unconscionable conduct and false and misleading misrepresenta-
tions as to the benefits provided by the policy.' 97 Under the provisions of
192. 578 S.W.2d at 507.
193. Id.
194. 574 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
195. The letter stated: "We are enclosing a benefit check in the amount of $1,000.00 for
the benefit period January 16, 1977 to February 15, 1977, which represents the maximum
and final benefit for the aforementioned disability.
"If we can be of further assistance to you, please do not hesitate to contact us." Id. at 578
n.3.
196. Id. at 579.
197. Id. at 580. The court came to the same conclusion on the deceptive trade practices
allegation as the court in General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Legate, 578
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the insurance policy, the insured had certain rights and the insurer had
certain obligations. Breach of the policy obligations by the insurer did not
extinguish the insured's right to be paid.' 98 Consequently, there was no
violation of section 17.50(a). Furthermore, unlike the insured in Royal
Globe Insurance Co. v. Bar Consultants, Inc.,19 here the insured did not
contend or prove reliance to his detriment upon statements made by the
insurer.
The court added that there was no violation of the Insurance Code that
would give rise to treble damage recovery under article 21.21, section
16(b)(1). 200 Article 21.21-221i provides remedies for injuries suffered as a
result of unfair claim settlement practices but does not confer a private
cause of action upon an individual injured by an unfair settlement prac-
tice. Rather, the State Board of Insurance, upon a finding of statutory
violation, is empowered to stop such unlawful practices by means of a
cease and desist order.2°2
Lastly, the court held that there was no authority for trebling the twelve
percent penalty and reasonable attorneys' fees that were authorized by ar-
ticle 3.62 of the Insurance Code.2 °3 Article 3.62 treats the twelve percent
penalty and attorneys' fees separately from the amount of the loss. Both
treble damage statutes, the one in the Insurance Code and the one in the
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, provide that when their provisions are vio-
lated an insured or a consumer is entitled to "three times the amount of
actual damages plus court costs and attorneys' fees reasonable in relation
to the amount of work expended.,, 2 ' The court modified and affirmed
judgment for the present value of the unpaid payments that had matured
and those to accrue, plus twelve percent penalty and the attorneys' fees.20 5
In response to the insured's suit under the Deceptive Trade Practices
Act, the insurance company in Dairyland County Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Harrison206 filed a plea of privilege to be sued in the county of its principal
place of business. The insured had purchased an automobile liability pol-
icy through an insurance agency, a defendant but not a party to the appeal,
so that an SR-22 form207 could be filed for the plaintiffs son pursuant to
S.W.2d 505 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, writ refd n.r.e.). See notes 188-91 supra and
accompanying text.
198. 574 S.W.2d at 580.
199. 577 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. 1979); see notes 167-84 supra and accompanying text.
200. This statute provides that three times the amount of actual damages plus court costs
and attorneys' fees are recoverable. TEX. INs. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16(b)(l) (Vernon
Pam. Supp. 1963-1979).
201. Id. art. 21.21-2.
202. Russell v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 548 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
203. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.62 (Vernon 1963).
204. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1980); TEX. INS. CODE
ANN. art. 21.21, § 16(b)(1) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1979).
205. 574 S.W.2d at 582.
206. 578 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
207. This is a form required by the Texas Department of Public Safety to show proof of




the Texas Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act.2"8 The form was filed
and a policy was issued. Prior to the expiration of the policy, the insured
contacted the agent and informed him that she was concerned that the
policy would expire before she could renew it; therefore, the SR-22 would
lapse and her son would lose his driver's license. The agent assured her
that the SR-22 would not be allowed to lapse. She sent a check payable to
the insurance company on March 23, 1977, based upon the oral assurances
of the agent that a new policy would be issued. On April 4, 1977, however,
Dairyland cancelled the policy, and the SR-22 lapsed. As a result, her
son's driver's license was suspended.
The trial court overruled the insurance company's plea of privilege, and
the court of civil appeals affirmed, relying on section 17.56 of the Decep-
tive Trade Practices Act. 20 9 The court held that under this section it was
sufficient for the insured to have alleged the cause of action under section
17.50 in order to maintain venue in a county where the defendant resides,
has his principal place of business, or has done business. The cause of
action need not be proven. The insurance company contended that the
insured did not allege a cause of action because she was not a consumer as
that term was defined in section 17.45(4).21° The court disagreed and held
that an insurance policy was a service purchased or leased for use.211 Fur-
ther, the court held that section 17.50(a)(4) was also applicable in this situ-
21ation. 12 The court stated that a person would, in fact, have to seek or
acquire a policy of insurance in order to be adversely affected by the unfair
acts or practices defined in the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Accord-
ingly, the court held that insurance policies are included within the cover-
age of section 17.50 of the Act.21 3
Miscellaneous Cases. The court was faced with the constitutionality of ar-
ticle 5.82 of the Insurance Code214 in Wallace v. Homan & Crimen, Inc. 215
208. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6701h (Vernon 1977).
209. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.56 (Vernon Supp. 1980) (venue).
210. That provision defines consumer as follows: "An individual ... who seeks or ac-
quires by purchase or lease, any goods or services." Id. § 17.45(4).
211. The court relied on the definition of services in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.45(2) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
212. This subsection provides: "(a) A consumer may maintain an action if he has been
adversely affected by. . . (4) the use or employment by any person of an act or practice in
violation of Article 21.21, Texas Insurance Code . . . or rules or regulations issued by the
State Board of Insurance under Article 21.21, Texas Insurance Code ..... Id.
§ 17.50(a)(4).
213. 578 S.W.2d at 190.
214. 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 330, § I at 864 (repealed, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 817,
pt. 4, § 4103, at 2064). This article provided:
Sec. 4. Notwithstanding any other law, no claim against a person or hospital
covered by a policy of professional liability insurance covering a person li-
censed to practice medicine. . . or a hospital licensed under the Texas Hospi-
tal Licensing Law, . . . whether for breach of express or implied contract or
tort, for compensation for a medical treatment or hospitalization may be com-
menced unless the action is filed within two years of the breach or the tort
complained of or from the date the medical treatment that is the subject of the
claim or the hospitalization for which the claim is made is completed, except
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Article 5.82 substantially shortened the statute of limitations for actions
involving claims against a person or hospital covered by a policy of profes-
sional liability insurance. The accident occurred sixteen years before the
passage of the statute. Had this statute not been passed, the plaintiff's
claim would not have been barred by the limitation statutes otherwise ap-
plicable. 216 The plaintiff contended that the statute was void because it
was retroactive and did not afford a reasonable time to bring suit on ac-
tions not yet barred by limitations.27 The court recognized that the legis-
lature has the right to provide a shorter period of limitations for an
existing cause of action and to create a statute of limitations for causes
where none previously existed, as long as it allows a reasonable time after
the law becomes effective to bring suit for actions that are not then
barred.218 Had this statute of limitations not allowed a reasonable time
from its effective date to bring suit on actions not yet barred, it would be
unconstitutional; however, that was not the case here.219
In Locomotive Engineers & Conductors Mutual Protective Association v.
Bush 220 the insurance company, a Michigan corporation, had contracted
with the insured, a railroad employee, to provide per diem payments for
lost wages if he became unemployed because of discharge or suspension as
a penalty or disciplinary measure. There was, however, a policy exception
that excluded coverage when the discharge was related to knowingly dis-
obeying orders, rules, or instructions. The policy further provided that the
cause of discharge assigned by the employer would conclusively determine
the liability of the insurer. This was the clause at issue. The employee was
discharged for knowingly disobeying safety rules. He filed suit, and the
trial court held that the provision stating that the cause assigned by the
employer would conclusively determine the liability of the insurance com-
pany was null and void as against public policy. The court further held
that the policy should be governed by the laws of Texas. The court of civil
appeals agreed with the trial court, holding that pursuant to articles 21.42
and 21.43 of the Insurance Code, Texas law applied. 22 1
that minors under the age of six years shall have until their eighth birthday in
which to file, or have filed on their behalf, such claim. Except as herein pro-
vided, this section applies to all persons regardless of minority or other legal
disability.
215. 584 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
216. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 4671-4678 (Vernon 1952) (injuries resulting in
death), art. 5526 (actions to be commenced within two years), & art. 5535 (persons under
disability) (Vernon 1958). In the instant case the plaintiff was a minor at the time of the
accident, and the applicable statute of limitations would not have run as of the filing date
had article 5.82 not been applicable. 584 S.W.2d at 323.
217. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16.
218. 584 S.W.2d at 323-24 (citing Wright v. Hardie, 88 Tex. 653, 32 S.W. 885 (1895);
Williams v. Reed, 160 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.)).
219. 584 S.W.2d at 324.
220. 576 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ).
221. Id. at 889. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.42 (Vernon 1963) provides:
Any contract of insurance payable to any citizen or inhabitant of this State by
any insurance company or corporation doing business within this State shall
be held to be a contract made and entered into under and by virtue of the laws
of this State relating to insurance, and governed thereby . . ..
19801
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The court of civil appeals disagreed with the holding that the provisions
in question were against public policy.222 The insured argued that the pro-
vision would preclude the courts from construing and making fact finding
conclusions under the contract. This could lead to collusion between em-
ployers and the insurance company, thereby precluding policyholders
from effectively having any coverage at all. The court defined a contract
against public policy as a provision or stipulation that is illegal or that is
inconsistent with or contrary to the best interests of the public.223 Parties
to an insurance contract, however, may adopt any legal form in the ab-
sence of statutory prohibitions. Insurers may limit their liability and im-
pose whatever conditions they please upon their obligations, not
inconsistent with public policy.224 The court stated that it was difficult to
perceive harm to the general public for two parties to contract as in this
case. There was no evidence of any collusion between the employer and
the insurance company or that the employer even knew that the insured
had the policy. The court held, therefore, that the provision did not violate
public policy and the insured was not entitled to recover.225
Id. art. 21.43(a) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1979) provides:
The provisions of this Code are conditions upon which foreign insurance cor-
porations shall be permitted to do business within this state, and any such
foreign corporation engaged in issuing contracts or policies within this state
shall be held to have assented thereto as a condition precedent to its right to
engage in such business within this state.
222. 576 S.W.2d at 890-91.
223. Id. at 890.
224. Id. at 890 (quoting Hatch v. Turner, 145 Tex. 17, 193 S.W.2d 668 (1946)).
225. 576 S.W.2d at 891-92.
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